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National Self-Defense, International Law, and
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Thomas Graham, Jr.*

The most publicized element of The National Securiy Strategy of the United
States of America (the "Strategy"), promulgated in September 2002 by the Bush
administration,' is its emphasis on the option to use preemptive military strikes
to address threats to the United States before they fully materialize. This is set in
the context of terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, or so-called rogue states,
such as Iraq or North Korea, acquiring and threatening to use weapons of mass
destruction-in other words, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The
terms "preemptive attack," "preventive war," and "anticipatory self-defense"
will be used interchangeably in this Article. Arguably, the term anticipatory selfdefense could imply action against a truly imminent, alleged threat, while
preventive war could be addressed to a threat that is yet to fully mature, with
preemptive attack somewhere in between. Even though the three terms are
somewhat different, the lines between them are not clear, and they all involve
aggressive action. Thus, the question becomes whether a particular attack is
justified under the rules of international law as a legitimate act of self-defense,
given the circumstances.
Section III of the Strategy states that the government will
defend the United States, the American people, and our interests at home
and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our
borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support
of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively
2
against such terrorists.
This Article addresses whether the implementation of this doctrine of
preemptive attack or preventive war is consistent with international law. It is
Ambassador Graham is Special Counsel at Morgan Lewis in the International Energy and
Department of Energy practice areas and former Special Representative of the President for
Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
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noteworthy that Section V of the Strategy itself places this new doctrine in the
context of international law:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an
attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against
forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and
international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the
existence of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to
attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail.
Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of
mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered coverdy,
3
and used without warning.
To emphasize that the aim of the Strategy is, in part, to adapt the
international law of self-defense to an age where weapons of mass destruction
are potentially in the hands of rogue states and terrorists, the Strategy also says:
"We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they
are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United
States and our allies and friends. ... We must deter and defend against the threat
4
before it is unleashed.",
Evidence that the United States was prepared to engage in preemptive
action in the past is beyond question. During the Cold War, if the government
had received reliable information that a Soviet thermonuclear first strike was
imminent, it would have contemplated using the highly accurate nuclear
counterforce weapons the United States possessed, such as the Peacekeeper
ICBM and the Trident D-5 nuclear missile, to remove such a threat. However,
the United States was always careful to insist that it followed a second-strike
policy and would only respond with its nuclear forces after being attacked, while
continuing to maintain a launch-on-warning option. The Soviet Union had to
assume in its nuclear planning that a counterforce attack on the United States
would be ineffective because the US missiles would be launched before the
arrival of Soviet weapons. However, this option was never raised to the level of
a doctrine, nor even a formal government position. It seems that the Strategy is
elevating preemptive attack, for the first time, to a doctrine that is supposed to
underpin policy decisions.
Thus, preemptive attack, which was never a doctrine or even a formal
policy, is raised by the Strategy to a doctrine of US military strategy. Yet arguably,
even though such action had been contemplated in the past, the United States
had never engaged in a preemptive military attack against another nation prior to
3
4
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the current conflict in Iraq. The United States had intervened to restore order, to
respond to an actual terrorist attack, to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, and to
seize a foreign leader central to the war on drugs-but prior to the conflict in
Iraq the United States had never taken a preemptive military action, defined as
an action to prevent an attack or use of force against the United States.' The
only time the United States came close to a preemptive use of military force was
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.6 During the crisis, strong arguments were made
in the counsels of the US government to conduct air strikes against the Soviet
intermediate range nuclear missile deployments before they became operational.
The air strikes would then have been followed by a ground invasion. However,
President Kennedy ruled out such an option, imposed a naval quarantine (a
much lesser use of force), and settled the crisis peacefully.
The United Nations Charter on its face rules out preemptive attack.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' The intention here was
to make a state's use of force, or threat of it, an illegitimate means of dealing
with interstate disputes.
Article 51 of the UN Charter does allow the use of force in self-defense,
but this authority is narrowly circumscribed:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
8
international peace and security.
Thus, according to the Charter, a Member of the United Nations can
engage in military acts of self-defense only after an armed attack has occurred,
and then only until the Security Council has taken control. There are conflicting
views as to what this language actually means. Some believe that Member states
have only those rights specifically granted by the Charter. Thus, self-defense
would be permitted only after an armed attack had already occurred-not in
anticipation of one. In San Francisco in 1945, Deputy US negotiator Harold
See Richard F. Grimmer, U.S. Use of Preemplive Militay Force 1, Cong Rsrch Serv (Sept 18,
2002), available online at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/13841.pdf>
(visited Apr 8, 2003).
6
7
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Stassen argued that this language was "intentional and sound. We did not want
exercised the right of self-defense before an armed attack had occurred."9
Professor Louis Henkin writes, "[T]he Charter intended to permit unilateral use
of force only in a very narrow and clear circumstance, in self-defense if an armed
attack occurs."' 0 Oppenheim states, "Article 51 of the Charter, moreover, expressly
preserves the right of individual or collective self-defense against armed
attack.""
The requirement that there be an armed attack is clear, but not without
difficulty. There are divided views whether it is permissible for a state to use
force in self-defense against an attack which has not yet actually begun but
is reasonably believed to be imminent. The better view is probably that
while anticipatory action in self-defense is normally unlawful, it is not
necessarily unlawful in all circumstances, the matter depending on the facts
of the situation including in particular the seriousness of the threat and the
degree to which pre-emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of
avoiding that serious threat; the requirements of necessity and
proportionality are probably even more pressing in relation to anticipatory
self-defense than they are in other circumstances. 12
Others argue that the rule set forth in the Charter did not extinguish
customary legal rights of self-defense and that military preparations obviously
undertaken as a prelude to an attack could legitimately be viewed as part of the
threatened attack. Some have asserted that "[t]he inclusion of the words 'nothing
...shall impair the inherent right' shows a clear intent not to restrict" the preCharter customary legal rights of anticipatory self-defense. 3 And it is important
to note that Article 2(4) of the Charter does outlaw the threat of the use of force
as well as its actual use. In the words of Sir Claud Humphrey Meredith Waldock,
"[Mt would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending
State to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow. ... To read
Article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first stroke."' 4
Advocates of this view argue that the drafters of the United Nations Charter did
not intend to prohibit anticipatory self-defense-which could amount to a
preemptive attack-by citing a report of the Charter drafting committee that
said, "The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and

9
10
11
12

13
14

Thomas M. Franck, When, f Ever, May States Deplqy Militagy Force Without PriorSecurity Council
Authorizaion?, 5 Wash UJ L & Poly 51, 58 (2001).
Louis Henkin, Council on Foreign Relations, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Poliy 295
(Columbia 2d ed 1979).
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds, Oppenheim's InternationalLaw 418 (Longman 9th ed
1992).
Id at 421-22.
Guy R. Phillips, Rules of Engagement:A Primer,Army Law 4, 12 (July 1993).
C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw, 81
Recueil Des Cours 455, 498 (1952).

Vol. 4 No. 1

NationalSeff-Defense, InternationalLaw, and Weapons ofMass Destruction

Graham

unimpaired."'" Further, they argue that state practice has long recognized an act
of anticipatory self-defense as legitimate.
However, Professor Michael Glennon, in an article last year, analyzed the
self-defense rule of the Charter and concluded that the language means what it
says and permits unilateral military action in self-defense only if an armed attack
has occurred. He cites testimony in July 2001 by former Defense Secretary
William Perry on the subject of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to the effect that
as a backup to a missile defense system, the United States could establish a
policy of targeting the missile launch sites of any nation threatening to attack the
United States with nuclear or biological weapons via long-range ballistic
missiles. 6 Professor Glennon suggests that this idea has merit, but it "would
plainly violate Article 51 of the United Nations Charter," as no armed attack
7
would have occurred.'
Professor Glennon also argues that the language of Article 51 is
profoundly in conflict with state behavior and, therefore, cannot be considered a
valid rule of international law regulating state behavior. "No rules will work that
do not reflect underlying geopolitical realities,"' 8 he says, and notes that there is
not even an accepted international definition of aggression, pointing out that
"[o]ne person's terrorist remains another's freedom fighter."' 9 And, in a
November 21, 2002 op-ed article in the New York Times, Professor Glennon
notes, "It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Charter provisions governing
use of force are simply no longer regarded as binding international law.", 2' But he
also correctly notes that this "breakdown ...of international rules governing the
use of force" is "[t]he urgent issue today.' 21 Conversely, some commentators
assert that even following the adoption of the Charter, states retain the right to
engage in anticipatory self-defense, and that while neither the Security Council
nor the International Court of Justice has authoritatively spoken on the question,
the practice of states and treaty codification would seem to confirm the
existence of this right under contemporary customary international law.22
Professor Ruth Wedgwood, in an article in the National Law Journal of
October 28, 2002, asserts that Article 51 does recognize "the right of every
nation to act in its own self-defense when it is the victim of an armed attack,"
and that "[m]ost international lawyers recognize the logic of Daniel Webster's

16

Report ofRapporteur of Committee I to Commission 1,6 Docs UN Conf Intl Org 446, 459 (1945).
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the

17

Id.

18

Id at 557.

19
20

Id at 558.
Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, NY Times A37 (Nov 21, 2002).

21

Id.
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Phillips, Army Law at 11-12 (cited in note 13).
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famous Caroline case in 1842, which allows a nation to act against a threat that is
'instant, overwhelming, and leaves no choice of means.' One need not wait until
23
the enemy's mobilized troops have crossed the border in order to respond.,
Professor Wedgwood implies, as have many commentators over the years, that
this rule must be updated through interpretation to reflect the realities of today's
world of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Specifically,
Professor Wedgwood notes, "A 'just in time' defense may not work in an age of
instant deliverables. ' 24 No longer, given the existence of these weapons, can
states wait to act in their own self-defense while armies mobilize near their
borders, or hostile navies near their shores. Professor Wedgwood, in a colloquy
reported in the Washington Post on September 29, 2002, argues:
There's a somewhat different reading under the U.N. Charter with a
relatively pacifistic bias, which is that you really just have to wait and take a
significant chance of having the first hit. ... There's quite a different
formulation that comes from, of all people, Elihu Root-secretary of war,
secretary of state, one of the founders of the American Society of
International Law. In 1914, Root declared 'the right of every sovereign state
to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too
late to protect itself.'
It's not surprising to me that how you apply Root's formulation would
change over time with the development of weapons of mass destruction.25
And seen in this light, arguably Secretary Perry's comment simply reflects the
exigencies of self-defense in today's world. However, in the same colloquy,
Professor Wedgwood also noted, "Traditionally, lawyers hold-and I think most
countries have held-that pure capability is not a sufficient casus belli .... And
pure capability with a smarmy attitude is not casus belli. 26
The rule of the Caroline case followed a failed rebellion outside of Toronto
in December 1837. The rebel leader, William Lyon Mackenzie, escaped across
the border to Buffalo, New York, and succeeded in convincing sympathetic
Americans that his situation paralleled that of the thirteen colonies. He called for
military volunteers to meet him on the American shore of the Niagara River,
and-accompanied by some two-dozen recruits-occupied an uninhabited
Canadian island. By the end of the month, Mackenzie's force grew to between
several hundred and one thousand men, mostly Americans. The British
responded by stationing about two thousand militiamen along the Canadian
shore and called upon the United States to stop the flow of men, arms, and
supplies to the island. As tensions rose, the British-Canadian commander
ordered a Royal Navy officer to capture or destroy a ferry that was being used to
23
24
25
26

Ruth Wedgwood, Strike atSaddam Now, Nat L J A16 (Oct 28, 2002).
Id.
Outlook: Six Degrees of Preemption,Wash Post B2 (Sept 29, 2002).
Id.
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bring supplies to the island. After rowing into the river, the officer discovered
that the steamer was not docked on the Canadian island, as had been reported,
but instead was docked on the US mainland. He decided to carry out his orders
anyway, and sank the ship. While only one person on board the ferry was killed,
US newspapers misreported the incident, further stoking tensions along the
border. The British claimed the attack was an act of self-defense, but the issue
festered for about five years.
In 1842, the United States and Britain finally settled the issue. During
negotiations in Washington, D.C., US Secretary of State Daniel Webster, as part
of the settlement, defined the conditions under which self-defense could be used
to justify an unprovoked attack on another nation. He wrote that an attack on
foreign territory would be justified only if the aggressor were able to show a
"necessity of self-defense instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation."27 He added that the attacking country
also had a responsibility to limit itself to self-defense measures and to do
nothing unreasonable or excessive.
This case sets forth a rule that is still binding precedent. In 1976, Israel's
ambassador to the United Nations quoted Webster's doctrine when justifying
Israel's operation to rescue hostages held at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda,
calling it "the classic formulation" of the right to self-defense (though its
applicability in that situation would appear to be questionable).28
However, in defining when self-defense could be used to justify an attack
on another nation, Secretary Webster emphasized that any such military action
based on self-defense must be proportionate to the threat and involve nothing
"unreasonable or excessive" 29 since the act justified by the necessity of selfdefense must be limited by the necessity.3" Thus, commentators have argued that
the three conditions for preemptive self-defense are:
1) whether the military response was necessary;
2)
whether the response was proportionate; and
3) whether the response was immediate.
These three principles are said to prevent states "from acting in retaliation or
reprisal, which is considered a violation of international law."31 The last of these
27

John Bassett Moore, 2 A Digest of International Law 412 (GPO 1906) (quoting Webster's

28

correspondence to Lord Ashburton, a special British representative to Washington in the
Caroline dispute).
United Nations, Securiy Council Debate and Draft Resolutions Concerning the Operation to Rescue

29

Hijacked Hostages at the EntebbeAirport,reprinted in 15 ILM 1224, 1231 (1976).
Christopher C. Joyner and Anthony Clark Arend, Anidpaing Humanitarian Intervention: An

30
31

Emeging LegalNorm?, 10 USAFA J Legal Stud 27, 34 (1999-2000).
Id.
Maureen F. Brennan, Comment, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S. Response, and
the Role of Customay InternationalLaw,59 La L Rev 1195, 1203 (1999).
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conditions, immediacy, has been somewhat diminished in importance by state
practice in an age of terrorism and attacks without warning. This "suggests that a
reasonably delayed response is acceptable where there is a need to gather
evidence of the attacker's identity and/or collect the intelligence and [organize
the] military force in order to strike back in a targeted manner."3 2 However, the
right of anticipatory self-defense "is always tempered by necessity and
proportionality principles," as is the right of self-defense generally.3 3 And again,
in today's world of nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
terrorism, a less precise definition of a potential threat justifying military action
under the rule permitting anticipatory self-defense is appropriate. Indeed, this is
the point of Section V of the Strategy.
Thus, the present state of international law as to the legitimate use of selfdefense is not entirely clear. Richard G. Maxon has argued that the following are
the important questions that generally should be addressed in considering
34
military action in self-defense:
1) "Is the proposed response aimed atprotectingthe status quo?" If not, it is not
really defensive in character.
2)
"Has there been a violation of a legal obligation? Each member state of the
United Nations is obligated by Article 2(4) to refrain from using force
or threats of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." Thus a clear and direct threat would
violate the Charter.
3)
"Has there been an actual armed attack from an externalsource?" Or, as the
World Court recognized in the Nicaragua case, indirect aggression
having the effect of an armed attack?
4) "Is the response, orproposedresponse, timey?"
5) "Is the militagy response in self-defense necessay?"
6)
"Is the military response in seff-defenseproportionateto the threat?"
7)
"Has any milita.y response been immediatey reportedto the Securiy Council?"
8)
"Has the Security Council taken meaningful, effective measures to stop the
aggressive conduct?"
While many of the questions related to anticipatory self-defense or
preemptive attack are those applicable to responsive self-defense, the unique
questions related to anticipatory self-defense are more difficult. Is there an

32

Angus Martyn, The Right of Self-Defence Under International Law-The Response to the Terrotist

Attacks of 11 September, available online at <http:/ /www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB /200133

02/02cibO8.htm> (visited Apr 8, 2003) (punctuation added).
George K. Walker, Antidpatogy Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have

Said, 31 Cornell inl LJ 321, 375 (1998).
34

Richard G. Maxon, Nature's Eldest Law: A Survey of a Nation's Right to Act in Self-Defense, 25
Parameters 55, 62-63 (Autumn 1995).
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immediate or imminent threat of an armed attack in terms of the rule in the
Carolinecase? More specifically, four questions are applicable:3"
1) "Are there objective indicators that an attack is imminent? Factors such as
troop buildups, increased alert levels, increased training tempo, and
reserve call-ups may suggest that an attack is imminent."
2)
"Does the past conduct or hostile declarations of the alleged aggressorreasonably
lead to a conclusion that an attack isprobable?"
3)
"What is the nature of the weapons available to the alleged aggressornation, and
does it have the ability to use them effectivey?"
4) "Is the use of force the last resort after exhausting all practicable, peaceful
means?" Diplomacy is always the best course to take for long-term
success if it is possible.
As the third question illustrates, weapons of mass destruction and longrange ballistic missile systems might make waiting for an actual armed attack
exceedingly dangerous. Thus, Secretary Perry's suggestion to target missile
launch sites could be construed as falling within the Caroline rule. In judging such
a case, much would depend on whether there had been a test program
demonstrating a long-range ballistic missile capability. Such a program could be
easily monitored by intelligence collection systems available to a number of
states. Another important consideration would be the likelihood that an alleged
aggressor had developed weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear
weapons. To possess nuclear weapons that are deliverable by ballistic missiles, a
nuclear weapons test program-also monitorable-is almost certainly required.
Crude nuclear weapons of the Hiroshima-type, which can be reliably constructed
without a test program, are too heavy and unwieldy to be delivered effectively by
a long-range ballistic missile. Chemical weapons affect only a limited geographic
area, and would not be worth delivering via long-range ballistic missiles.
Biological weapons are slow acting, unlikely to have a short-term military effect,
and the microbes would probably be destroyed by the missile impact. Both
chemical and biological weapons are probably more suitable as terrorist weapons
than for use on the battlefield, given these limitations on their effectiveness and
long-range deliverability. However, it should be noted that many terrorist
organizations do not have or leave any return address. Even with modern
weapons, can a reasonably reliable warning of attack be expected or is it more
likely that such an attack will come by surprise? If the former, it would be
reasonable to wait for the warning before acting in anticipatory self-defense. If
the latter, there would seem to be a lesser obligation to wait before taking
preemptive action.
Of course the delivery of crude nuclear weapons by aircraft would be a
possibility, posing a threat to neighboring countries, but likely not distant
35

Id at 64.
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countries. Therefore, the proximity of the potential aggressor state is also an
issue. In addition, one truly difficult issue involves classified information that an
attack is coming, but which a government cannot release to the public because
its release would compromise that government's intelligence sources and
methods. What burden of proof must a government carry to operate within the
rule of international law? Can it act legally on its secret information and trust
that later events will justify its actions?
And, should the alleged aggressor nation be a modern nuclear weapon state
such as Russia or China, preemptive military attack or preventive war is unlikely
to be a viable option, since such an action could trigger a nuclear war. It would
only be attempted in the most desperate of circumstances, as in the Cold War
option of launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack. Thus, a Cold War-style
nuclear deterrence strategy with a secure second-strike capability is the only
practical policy in dealing with a modern nuclear weapon state. As a result, a
threatened preemptive strike in anticipatory self-defense would be a viable
option only against states that have not become modern nuclear weapon states.
This is a strong reason for weighing this option very carefully indeed, lest more
states become encouraged to develop nuclear weapons.
Together, these questions form a test for the legality of steps taken in the
name of preventive attack or anticipatory self-defense. A case worth examining
in this context is the preemptive attack by Israel on the Osiraq nuclear power
reactor in Iraq some twenty years ago. On June 7, 1981, Israel sent fourteen
F-16 Falcons to Iraq, with two one thousand kilogram bombs each, and six F-15
Eagles serving as escort planes, to destroy Iraq's Osiraq nuclear power reactor
shortly before it was ready to go "on line," that is, to become operational with
nuclear fuel.3 6 The Israelis claimed the right of preemptive self-defense, asserting
that an operational reactor would be a step in the direction of Iraq acquiring
nuclear weapons, which would pose a direct and immediate threat to Israel.
Israel justified its attack on the theory that Iraq refused to recognize Israel's
right to exist and endorsed violence against Israel. A completed nuclear reactor
would have allowed Iraq to create the nuclear material necessary to develop
nuclear weapons. Those nuclear weapons could be used against Israel.
Therefore, argued Israel, its attack was lawful as self-defense.37

36

37

Louis Rene Beres and Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destrnction of Iraq's Osiraq
Nuclear Reactor, 9 Temple Intl & Comp LJ 437, 438 (1995); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and
Preempion: Choosing the Least Unattractive Option Under InternationalLaw, 14 Dick J Intl L 187,
203-05 (1996).
Byard Q. Clemons and Gary D. Brown, Rethinking InternationalSelf-Defense: The UnitedNations'
Emeging Role, 45 Naval L Rev 217, 227 (1998). See also Louis Rene Beres and Yoash
Tsiddon-Chatto, Twenty-One Years Later: Israel, Iraq, and InternationalLaw, Jewish Star Times
(June 19, 2002).
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Nevertheless, this action was strongly condemned by the Security Council,
and the United States joined in a Security Council resolution denouncing the raid
as illegal under international law. Referring to the attack, British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher said, "Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be
justified. It represents a grave breach of international law.",38 The United Nations
Security Council, in Resolution 487 of June 19, 1981, "strongly" condemned the
attack and indicated that under international law, "Iraq is entitled to appropriate
redress for the destruction it has suffered. 3 9
In hindsight, what judgment can be made with respect to this case? We
now know, as a result of the Gulf War and subsequent inspections by the United
Nations in the 1990s, that Iraq was in fact attempting to produce nuclear
weapons, had an aggressive nuclear weapon program, and likely was within a few
years of acquiring such weapons in 1990. If the Osiraq reactor had gone online
in 1981, a substantial amount of spent fuel would have accumulated within
several years. From this fuel it would have been possible to chemically separate
plutonium and construct Hiroshima-type nuclear weapons relatively quickly.
Thus, Saddam Hussein could have been in possession of crude nuclear weapons
in advance of the Gulf War, even without nuclear weapon explosive tests. The
necessary chemical reprocessing plant would have been easy to hide, unlike a
power reactor, which is comparatively large.
Iraq was also developing medium-range SCUD missiles with sufficient
range to reach Israel. These are World War II technology ballistic missiles: slow,
large, and inaccurate. However, at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq possessed a
number of such missiles and actually fired some into Israeli territory.
A nuclear weapons test program would have been necessary to develop
nuclear weapons small and light enough to be carried on these missiles. Such a
program would have taken at least several years and would certainly have been
detectable as the necessary tests could not have been effectively hidden. On the
other hand, by the time Iraq had begun such tests, it probably could have been
stopped from developing such weapons only by a military invasion. This would
have been very unlikely prior to the Gulf War, given the lack of public support
for any such action before the provocation of the Kuwait invasion.
Under the test set forth above, the Israeli response was aimed at protecting
the status quo, yet there still was not a violation of a legal obligation, nor had
there been an armed attack. Arguably, the military response was timely,
necessary, and proportionate, given that there was little collateral damage. No
attack was imminent, but past conduct indicated that the possibility of a
devastating attack some years into the future had to be taken seriously. The
weapons that the Israelis believed Iraq was seeking-correctly as it turned out38
39

Bruce Ackerman, But What's the Legal Casefor Preemption?,Wash Post B2 (Aug 18, 2002).
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were nuclear weapons, perhaps deliverable by ballistic missile, and such weapons
would have been a grave threat to the survival of Israel. And almost certainly a
diplomatic solution was not possible, given the nature of the government of
Iraq. Thus, perhaps Israel's action was justified and consistent with the rule of
the Caroline case.
However, this hindsight view is not a sound basis for a rule of law.
Otherwise, nations around the world will seek nuclear weapons, claiming selfdefense, on the basis of the propensity of some nations to engage in preemptive
attacks allegedly justified under international law, and will thereby destroy the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") regime that is essential to world
peace and security. Such nations would heed some variation of the statement,
perhaps apocryphal, but sometimes attributed to George Fernandez, the Indian
Defense Minister, that "before one challenges the United States, one must first
acquire nuclear weapons."4 ° It would be deeply contrary to the interests of the
United States, as well as the interests of the world community, to encourage
such a psychology. Also, there is the question of how to respond to a threat
emanating from within a country but not from its government-for example, a
country too weak to suppress a highly sophisticated terrorist organization
operating within its territory. Could international law countenance an act of
anticipatory self-defense, otherwise justified, against the territory of such a state
and over the wishes of the government on the ground that the government in
question was not in control of its own territory? This presents a difficult issue.
The new doctrine set forth in the Strategy declares that the United States
will not hesitate to act preemptively, alone if necessary, against rogue states and
terrorists that threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction. But
the Strategy also sets this doctrine within the rubric of international law, and
states that the world community "must adapt the concept of imminent threat to
the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."41 The current military
action against Iraq is the first application of this doctrine; therefore, it is only
fitting that it should also serve as the first test of the legality of that doctrine and
the updated concept of preventive attack or anticipatory self-defense that it
embraces. The questions presented above could be employed as a test of such
legality in this case of preemptive military action against Iraq.
Military action against Iraq, if authorized by a new Security Council
mandate, would have presented quite a different set of legal issues, since such
action would have been permitted under international law. Given that the
Security Council, pursuant to Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002,42 had for
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some months been demanding that Iraq disarm with respect to its weapons of
mass destruction and permit inspectors access to Iraqi territory to verify this
disarmament, the current issue should be looked at in light of Resolution 1441
and the support of the world community for this resolution. If Iraq did not
comply with the resolution and attempted to hide or deny access to weapons of
mass destruction, the Security Council could have ordered the use of "all
necessary means" to compel compliance, thereby authorizing military action
against Iraq. Military action taken by the United States or any other state
pursuant to such authorization would have been legal under international law.
On February 14, 2003, the Chief Inspectors, Dr. Hans Blix and Mohammed el
Baradei, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"),
reported mixed results to the Security Council on the issue of Iraq's compliance
with the resolution. On March 7, 2003, they returned to the Council with a
somewhat more positive report. Not long after that, on March 20, 2003, the
United States, supported by the United Kingdom, terminated the inspection
process and launched a preemptive military attack on Iraq. The United States
asserted that its own intelligence indicated that Iraq did, in fact, possess weapons
of mass destruction, notwithstanding the inspectors' findings, and that these
weapons represented an imminent threat to the security of the United States.
This attack is indistinguishable from a preemptive attack outside the United
Nations' system, as it bypassed the UN and Resolution 1441. Whether this
action, taken outside of Security Council authorization under the rationale of the
new doctrine, is legal as self-defense under international law depends heavily on
the facts and the degree to which they can be ascertained.
In a letter dated October 15, 2002 to President Bush, the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York had strongly urged that the administration
consider military action against Iraq only in the context of a new Security
Council resolution. The letter referred to Secretary Webster's rule, and also
recognized that "what constitutes an imminent threat today cannot be limited to
what constituted an imminent threat in Secretary Webster's day., 43 However, the
letter went on to say that on the basis of information so far made publicly
available:
[The United States] has itself not appeared to present the case of an actual
or imminent Iraqi attack. In our view, the distinction is not simply a
question of uncertainty as to 'the time and place of an attack.' More
fundamentally, the United States has so far not publicly made a claim of any
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certainty or even probability of an Iraqi attack against the United States that
rises to a level of imminence justifying unilateral action at the present time."4
This letter, I believe, highlights concerns about secrecy-that if a world order
governed by a system of international law is to have a chance to be workable,
nation states must openly justify their actions. Otherwise, virtually any action can
be justified on the basis of "secret information" to which no one else is privy.
The Strategy suggests a broad world-policing role to defend the United
States and its allies. But exactly how far can the doctrine of preventive action go?
Would it apply to a potential conflict where our interests-but not a specific
alliance organization-are involved? For example, would a potential attack by
India on Pakistan, an important ally for the US in the war on terrorism, give rise
to the possibility of preventive action against India?
Transparency and predictability are important to the perceived legitimacy
of any assertions about the existence of weapons of mass destruction. If the
United States intends to assume such a broad world-policing role, as is suggested
by the Strategy, it is essential for the United States to support those international
treaty regimes and other international institutions, designed to make the facts in
any given case more transparent. Support for the NPT regime, which legally
binds all of the world's nations save five (India, Pakistan, Israel, East Timor, and
North Korea, which has recently renounced the NPT), is essential to preventing
the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Also, a new verification
protocol,"5 providing for intrusive worldwide inspection to help enforce this
treaty regime, was negotiated five years ago in Vienna, although only a handful
of countries have ratified it. The United States should ratify this protocol as part
of its new Strategy. Further, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT")
provides for a worldwide, all-embracing, intrusive verification system on land,
sea, and air, which will detect even the smallest nuclear detonation. The United
States signed the Treaty in 1996, but the Senate rejected it in 1999. Three of the
other four NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, the United Kingdom,
France, and Russia, have ratified the CTBT, and China is expected to do so
upon ratification by the United States. If the United States desires to be seen as
consistent in its actions relating to the new Strategy, it must, among other things,
promptly ratify the CTBT. The nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties should also be
considered part of the transparency process, as they enhance the NPT-based
International Atomic Energy Agency verification procedures. The United States
is the only nuclear weapon state that has not ratified the supporting protocols
for the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of
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Rarotonga.4 6 With Russia and the United Kingdom, the US stands apart from
the other two nuclear weapon states in not ratifying the relevant supporting
protocols of the Treaty of Pelindaba, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty.4 v On the other hand, the United States, along with the other four nuclear
weapon states, has ratified the supporting protocols to the Latin American
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.8 If the United
States is serious about its new Strategy, it should act similarly with respect to the
Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, as these treaties are important contributors
to transparency. And how can the US argue the case for preemptive attack to
prevent attacks on the US with weapons of mass destruction, to include
biological weapons, and refuse the negotiation of a verification protocol to the
Biological Weapons Convention?
Now turning to the test 'case of the preemptive military attack on Iraq,
under today's circumstances, outside of Resolution 1441, let us apply Richard G.
Maxon's test, described previously:49
1) "Was the response aimed at protecting the status quo?" Probably not, since
the administration has stated that it is seeking "regime change."
2)
"Was there a violation of a legal obligation?" Yes, Iraq has violated the
terms of the cessation of the Persian Gulf War, and sixteen United
Nations Security Council resolutions related to this matter. The US
has also argued that the facts indicate that Iraq has violated
Resolution 1441.
3)
"Was there an actualattack?" No.
4)
"Was the response timey?" No evidence has been advanced that would
purport to answer the question of why such an action is necessary
now.
5)
"Was the militay response necessay?" No, since there is no imminent,
identifiable threat (very different from the situation Israel faced in
1981, with the impending completion of the Osiraq reactor and the
threat of reprocessing to obtain plutonium) against the United States
or anyone else.
6)
"Was the response proportionate?" If Iraq truly were threatening to
develop weapons of mass destruction deliverable against the United
States, particularly nuclear weapons combined with long-range
46
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ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles-which is in doubt-regime
change as a war objective would be proportionate.
7)
"Was the action immediatey reported to the Securiy Council?" This is not
applicable here.
8)
"Did the Securioy Council take meaningul, effective measures to stop the
aggressive conduct?" It is currently seized with the issue and has been for
more than a decade.
9)
Was there "an imminent or immediate threat of an armed attack" from Iraq,
even considering modem capabilities of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles? No. In March 2003, Saddam Hussein's sole objective seemed
to be to preserve his rule. An aggressive step toward the United States
or any other nation would have triggered his demise.
10) Were there "objective indicators that an attack [vas] imminent," such as troop
buildups, missile tests and deployments, and nuclear tests? No. The objective
indicators suggested that he was preparing for an invasion, not
preparing to attack another nation.
11) Did "the past conduct or hostile declarations of the alleged aggressor reasonaby
lead to a conclusion that an attack [was]probable?" Perhaps in the past, but
not now.
12) What was "the nature of the weapons available to the alleged aggressor nation,
and [did] it have the abiliy to use them effectively?" It appears that Iraq had
a limited air force, had virtually no usable medium or long range
ballistic missiles, was years away from a nuclear weapon, had a greatly
weakened army, and had no means of delivering the chemical and
biological weapons it likely possesses except possibly through
terrorist agents. Compared to other threats such as North Korea, al
Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations, Iraq was not a short-term
probable threat.
13) Was "the use of force the last resort after exhausting all practicable,peaceful
means?" Certainly not, as of March 2003.
To sum up, military action against Iraq did not appear to be directed at
protecting the status quo. No immediate attack by Iraq threatened the United
States or its allies. No evidence had been advanced that explained why
immediate military action against Iraq was necessary. And, finally, the military
force available to Iraq appeared to be limited in scope and effectiveness. Thus,
this preemptive attack on Iraq, without the sanction of the Security Council,
does not appear to have been consistent with international law. A majority of the
members of the Security Council interpreted Resolution 1441 (and all past
resolutions) as requiring a new Security Council resolution authorizing the use of
force, based on the reports of the inspectors, before it could be said that military
action against Iraq was taken pursuant to Security Council auspices. And surely,
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a majority of the Security Council is the appropriate interpreter of its own
resolutions, as opposed to one or two of its members.
Thus, if the plan of preemptive military action against Iraq, taken outside
of the generally held interpretations of Resolution 1441, is illustrative of the
proper interpretation of the new Strategy doctrine, the doctrine must be regarded
as seriously questionable under international law. If, on the other hand, the
clause stating that the US would be prepared to act preemptively, alone if
necessary, is properly interpreted as referring to action either pursuant to
international law rules or as authorized by the Security Council, then the Strategy
doctrine would be consistent with international law. As of April 2003, the
former would seem to be the correct interpretation. The Bush administration
made it clear that, in its opinion, it did not need a new Security Council
resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq. This was contrary to the views of a
majority of the Security Council, which did not interpret Resolution 1441 as
authorizing force. According to an article in the Washington Post on March 17,
2003, the administration gave the United Nations one more day to support the
US/British draft resolution which would have authorized force, but that the
administration had made it clear that this was "mostly for show."' Indeed,
Robert D. Novak, in his column in the Chicago Sun-Times on the same day,
indicated that the Vice President had implied in a private meeting on Capitol Hill
the previous week that "the quest for UN sanctioning" for war in Iraq was
"merely a means of securing Britain as a junior military partner.""s And, as noted
above, a preemptive attack on Iraq was not at this time justifiable under the rules
of international law.
In conclusion, the above analysis indicates that the apparent intended
implementation of the new Strategy is not consistent with international law.
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